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Abstract
Public “Beta” launches have become a preferred route of entry into the markets for new
software products and web site based services. While beta testing of novel products is nothing
new, typically such tests were done by experts within firm boundaries. What makes public
beta testing so attractive to firms? By introducing semi-completed products in the market, the
firm can target the early adopter population, who can then build the potential market through
the word of mouth effect by the time the actual version of the product is launched. In addition,
the information gathered through the usage of the public beta gives significant insights into
customer preferences and consequently helps in building a better product. We build these mar-
keting and product development implications in an analytical model to compare the different
product introduction strategies like “skimming” or “penetration pricing”with beta launches.
This analysis is done for products of branded and unbranded Web 2.0 companies like Google
and Flickr etc. We also examine the impact of different monetization models like direct pricing
and advertising on the beta launch strategy.
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1 Introduction
It is very common to come across pubic beta launches of software products and web site
based services. Examples of software products that have used betas are Internet Explorer and
Microsoft Office (while introducing upgrades) and µtorrent (a bit torrent client). Examples
of web site betas are Gmail and Flickr, the earlier of these still remains in beta. Why is this
strategy of introducing software products and services becoming popular? To answer this we
must first understand the possible reasons behind why firms may find this strategy attractive.
One reason is to do with product development. Beta testing phase has typically been the
comprehensive testing phase in which software is stress-tested prior to market launch. This
testing is done by technically adept testers who provide feedback on bugs and potential feature
alterations. It has long been recognized that this way of testing software is costly and inef-
ficient, and has become even more so with the increasing complexity present in the software
products today. Previous academic literature points out the economic advantages of involving
end-users in the product development process (Eric von Hippel 1998). With the advent of In-
ternet and the penetration of broadband, it is becoming easier to involve users in the software
testing process at low cost. This makes comprehensive testing feasible since the software is
tested on combinations of software and hardware components (Computing Canada March 3,
2006). Further, it improves the identification of the features and feature alterations desired by
end users and improves the efficiency of application development. Close involvement with
end-users helps implement the tried and tested methodology of agile development (Computer
Weekly October 10, 2006). Thus public beta launches may help improve the cost efficiency of
the product development process in a significant way.
The other reason for adoption of public beta launches is to do better introductory marketing
of the product. Marketing literature has long studied optimal product launch strategies. The fo-
cus has been on studying the sales curve of the product and relating it to firm’s choice variables
like pricing and advertising. Mahanjan, Muller, and Bass (1990) provide a comprehensive sur-
vey of these product diffusion models. The work of Krishnan, Bass, and Jain (1999) relates
the optimal pricing strategy to sales growth patterns. For a durable product, several situations
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may influence the optimal price path. Jain, Muller, and Vicassim (1999) find that existence
of customers with different valuations, usage levels and price sensitivities drive the choice
of skimming (decreasing price path) or penetration pricing (increasing price path) strategies.
Uncontrolled software piracy has also been cited as a reason for skimming pricing strategies
(Nascimento and Vanhonacker (1988)). In a competitive situation, it has been suggested that
an initial high price is appropriate for products with a unique advantage over others (Hultink,
Hart, Robben, and Griffin (2000). However, if diffusion of the product is important, penetra-
tion pricing may be employed to hinder product launches by competitors (Choffray and lilien
(1984), Kalish and Lilien (1990)). Besanko and Winston (1990) focus on the how expectations
of declining prices by rational customers impact the firm’s pricing policy. Other notable works
that study pricing are by Raman and Chatterjee (1995) and Krishnan, Bass, and Jain (1999).
Bayus (1992), Norton and Bass (1987) and Padmanabhan and Bass (1991) study an interesting
variation of the pricing problem where they consider the presence of improved generations of
a product. This situation is the closest to our work since one could consider the public beta
product and the final product as successive product generations. In addition to pricing, the ad-
vertising of new products is important to raise product awareness. Horsky and Simon (1983)
Kalish (1985), Krishnan and Jain (2006) and Krishnamoorthy, Prasad, and Sethi (2008) have
analyzed optimal advertising spending levels for new products along the product life cycle.
In addition to explicit advertising, word of mouth effect has also been long recognized to an
important factor in increasing sales (Bass (1969)). To create a strong word of mouth effect,
marketers must ensure that the product is adopted by sufficient numbers of consumers early on
in the product life cycle. These early adopters then help in diffusing the product knowledge in
the rest of the potential market, thus serving as enablers of the product adoption process. The
customers who have a propensity to adopt the product early are called innovators while those
who tend to follow them are called imitators in marketing parlance. Horsky (1990) reports that
if word of mouth effects are weak, the monopolist prefers a price skimming strategy. In case
of experience goods, the word of mouth effect may be negative. This aspect has been explored
by Mahajan, Muller, and Kerin (1984). Other reasons impacting the demand pattern of a new
product have been studied by Golder and Tellis (1997) who focus on the takeoff portion of the
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sales curve where the product gets established in the market whereas Gupta, Jain, and Sawhney
(1999) study the sales for a product whose demand is effected by the sales of a complementary
product (e.g. hardware and software). Some other papers that focus on interesting aspects
of the new product adoption process are by Souza, Bayus, and Wagner (2004), Song (2003),
Smith (1986), Golder and Tellis (1997), Bridges, Yim, and Briesch (1995), Narasimhan (1989)
and Lee and Connor (2003).
Creating an initial adopter population is a huge challenge and there is a realization that
beta launches may help acquire early adopters. The Wall Street Journal November 28, 2005
observes that there is nothing else in the marketing world where marketers knowingly introduce
a flawed or an inadequate product, yet it helps grow the product’s user base. Articles from New
York Times July 22, 2004 and TechNewsWorld March 29, 2005 report that early adopters of
products attach a lot of value to having a branded new product that few other people may
have. There are several examples of this phenomenon. Accounts on Google’s Gmail were
only made available through invitations when Gmail was introduced. This created such a
frenzy for acquiring a Gmail address that at one point Gmail invitations were auctioned off
at Ebay for as high as $200. Another example is that of new versions of the popular World
of Warcraft Computer game of Blizzard Entertainment. Test accounts of this game went for
as much as $500 on Ebay (New York Times (July 22, 2004)). Thus exclusivity may be quite
important for innovators in the context of products of big banners like Google etc and these
firms may in response create scarcity for the beta product. This presents an interesting contrast
with Web 2.0 products which are typically started by relatively unknown firms. The business
models of these products are usually based on value addition to the product through inputs of
other users. For example websites such as del.icio.us becomes a more valuable product for
its users as people use it and add bookmarks satisfying a wide range on interests. Clearly,
the product development of these products depends not only upon the R&D efforts of the firm
but also upon the users the web site. Thus network externalities are extremely important for
creating value for such products and therefore such firms may want to ease adoption by the
innovators rather than create scarcity. Clearly, beta launches for increasing product adoption
may proceed in dissimilar ways by branded and unbranded Web 2.0 firms. Our purpose in
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this paper is to focus on both these types of firms and do a comprehensive analysis of their
beta launch policies accounting for the product development and marketing benefits of public
betas. Thus this paper combines product development and marketing issues which addresses
a significant gap in the literature. Exceptions are work by Ofek and Savary 2003 and Dogan,
Ji, Mookerjee, and Radhakrishnan (2008). Ofek and Sarvary (2003) consider firms’ choices of
R&D and marketing variables such as advertising but do not consider the sales impact of word
of mouth effects, which we do. Dogan, Ji, Mookerjee, and Radhakrishnan (2008) do focus on
word of mouth effects but do not consider the demand side impact of exclusivity and network
externalities, which is a central feature of our work.
We now discuss the specific questions that a firm needs to consider when considering a beta
launch. In order to do so, we first define a beta product as one that is of a lesser quality than
the final product. The first set of questions relate to the firm’s decisions on the choice variables
of product quality and price in the beta phase as well as the final launch. It is interesting
to note that the so called beta versions could be of very high quality despite the perception
that they must have inherent flaws due to their beta status. A New York Times July 22, 2004
article reports that, “Gmail feels like a final release...it might be much more of a marketing
tool than an actual beta in the traditional sense.” Essentially, a new product may be a final
release, yet they may be called betas. There is also a general perception that firms do not
charge for betas. While this may be more common, there are examples where firms have
put a price to consumers using the beta versions. For example, Flickr charged $59.99 per
year when it was still in beta phase (ZDNet News February 11, 2005) and Microsoft charged
users $32 for testing out Windows 95 (Economist August 31, 1996). We want to analyze
whether putting a price to betas is an optimal strategy. The second major question is to analyze
the conditions under which a beta launch is optimal as compared to other possible strategies
associated with new product introductions such as skimming or penetration pricing along with
an upfront launch of the final product. In this work, we aim to provide answers to both these
set of questions using an analytical model.
Many times, the revenue models of Internet based products (e.g. Gmail) employ an adver-
tising model in place of a direct pricing model. We propose to study variations of the direct
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pricing models proposed earlier in this paper to analyze how beta launch decisions may be
impacted due to change in the monetization approach. The rest of the paper is structured as
follows. Section 2 presents the model with direct pricing for the branded product when ex-
clusivity is important. Section 3 focuses on the branded product with monetization through
advertising. Section 4 presents the model with direct pricing for the Web 2.0 based firms when
network externalities rather than exclusivity are important and Section 5 extends this analysis
to the advertising based revenue model. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2 Branded Products with Direct Pricing
2.1 The Model
We consider a two period model. In the first period, the firm takes the following two decisions
in sequence:
1. Firm decides the quality (v) for the initial launch and develops it.
2. Firm decides the price (b) for the initial launch and introduces product.
This sequence reflects the fact that product quality is determined well in advance of product
pricing. There are two types of customers: innovators (or experimentors) and imitators. When
a new product is released, the innovators try out the product in the first period. The imitators
get informed about the product details through innovators and enter the market in the second
period. Let the number of imitators brought in by each innovator is x. In the second period, the
firm addresses the expanded market consisting of both the innovators and imitators. In order
to do so, it again takes two decisions sequentially:
1. Firm decides the additional quality (u) to be developed for the final launch, and,
2. Firm decides the price (p) for the final launch.
We take the maximum possible final product quality to be T . Thus v ∈ [0, T ] and u ∈
[0, T − v]. If the firm does not improve the quality of its product in the second period (u = 0),
it implies that the firm entered the market with the final product right in the first period. On
6
the other hand, if the firm improves the quality in the second period (u > 0), we take the first
period product to be a beta launch.
Next, we define the utility functions for the innovators in periods 1 and 2 and for the
imitators in period 2. In the first period, the value proposition for innovators arises from (i)
using the product; this is dependent on the quality of the product, and, (ii) the value that they get
because of having a “new” product which few others have. This kind of value is recognized in
literature to be the value from exclusivity, or “snob effect” Pesendorfer (1995). We model the
value from exclusivity to be increasing in the product quality in that period (v). If a fraction t1
of the innovators buy the product, the simplest utility function that captures the above features
is v + v(1− t1)a, where a > 0 captures the value of exclusivity associated with the particular
brand. The more branded the firm launching the product, the higher the value of a will be.
By the second period, the product is no longer new and so no longer provides exclusivity.
Consequently, both the innovators and imitators, have the same utility function which presents
the value from using the product, v + u, in this period.
We assume that all customers (imitators and innovators) are heterogeneous with respect to
their value of outside opportunities which are uniformly distributed in [0, 1] in each period.
This reflects foregone utility from other options (individual rationality). Suppose the price of
initial launch is b. Then the number of innovators who try the initial launch can be found from
v + v(1− t1)a− b ≥ t1, (1)
which reflects that fact that all innovators who derived value greater than their outside option
try the product.
In the second period, the total number of potential buyers for the final product are all the
innovators and xt1 imitators. Let the price of the final product be p. We assume that price
discrimination between imitators and innovators is not possible. Further, those who bought the
product in the first period can no longer use it in the second period. This may happen due to
first period subscription for a web site expiring in the second period, or the functionality of
a software being turned off after a pre-specified time, as is common with trial versions. The
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innovators who buy the final product can be found from
v + u− p ≥ t2, (2)
where t2 is the fraction of innovators who buy the product. Similarly, the fraction of imitators
who try the final product is found from
v + u− p ≥ t3. (3)
Thus the numbers of imitators who buy the final product are t3xt1.
We now define the profit function of the firm. To do this, we first look at the revenues.
In the second period, since there are t2 innovators and t3xt1 imitators buying the product, the
revenue function is given by
R2 = p(t2 + t3xt1). (4)
Similarly, in the first period, since there are t1 innovators buying the product, the revenue
function is given by
R1 = bt1. (5)
Next, we look at the fixed and marginal costs associated with the product. We assume that
the marginal cost of a new copy of the software is 0. However, there is a cost involved in R&D
to produce the initial release and the subsequent final release. We assume that these costs are
linearly increasing in product quality. Thus product development costs in the first period are
Fv. We further assume that the feedback obtained from innovators who use the initial release
can be used as an additional input to improve the final product (if the initial product does
not incorporate full functionality). We model this by assuming that the cost of the additional
functionality incorporated in the final product is reduced from Fu to (F −Jt1)u. This reflects
that the larger the number of innovators who try out the beta, the better the feedback, and hence
the higher the cost savings. Note that we assume the cost of product development to be linearly
increasing in quality, unlike other literature where cost of product development is taken to be
convex in quality. Our cost structure captures the essence of the nature of R&D costs and at
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the same time helps us to focus on the split of quality development between the beta release
and the final product.
The profit functions for the firm in the second period can therefore be written as follows:
pi2 = pt2 + p(t3xt1)− (Fu− Jt1u). (6)
The total profit for the firm in both periods is given by the sum of the profits for the two periods,
i.e.
pi1 = (bt1 − Fv) + pi2, (7)
where the first term in paranthesis reflect the profit in the first period.
2.2 Analysis and Results
We are mainly interested in the following: first, what are the characteristics of a public beta
launch (functionality, price); and second, when is launch of public beta optimal. Note that,
instead of pre-committing to a full quality final launch upfront, the firm decides on the quality
increment (if any) after the initial launch with a view to maximizing profits in final launch.
We perform the analysis assuming that the maximum quality the firm can go to is T , and take
v and u as the qualities for initial release and additional quality in final release, respectively.
To solve the firms profit maximization problem, we will use the standard backward induction
technique.
We first report on the fraction of the market captured by the firm in periods 1 and 2.
LEMMA 1. The market fraction captured by the firm are given as follows:
t1 =
−b+ v(1 + a)
1 + av
(8a)
t2 = −p+ u+ v (8b)
t3 = −p+ u+ v. (8c)
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In addition,
v − 1 ≤ b ≤ v(1 + a) (9a)
(u+ v − 1) ≤ p ≤ (u+ v). (9b)
Our next result characterizes the possible equilibrium product introduction and pricing
strategies for the firm. We introduce some simplifications in the model at this point. First, we
restrict the maximum technically feasible quality of the product, T = 1. This restriction im-
plies that the outside opportunity for some customer matches the direct utility (utility without
the exclusivity value) from using the product. In other words, the product is not “too superior”
to the other options available in the market. Second, we also restrict the number of imitators
bought in by each innovator so that x < 4(1 + a). This ensures that the market remains
uncovered in period 1 (t1 < 1).
PROPOSITION 1. If the firm decides to introduce a product, it has the following options:
1. It can introduce the product with the technically feasible quality right in the first period
so that v = 1, b = 1+a2 − x8 , u = 0, p = 12 .
2. It can introduce the product with a quality less than the technically feasible quality in the
first period and then improve the product to the technical feasible quality in the second
period so that:
A. If J >
√
1 + a, v = v∗, b = 0, u = 1− v∗ and p = 12 .
B. If 1 < J <
√
1 + a
i. x > 4(1+a)(1+a−J
2)
aJ , v = v∗, b = 0, u = 1− v∗ and p = 12 .
ii. x ≤ 4(1+a)(1+a−J2)aJ , v = vth1, b = 0, u = 1− vth1 and p = 12 .
C. If J < 1, v = vth1, b = 0, u = 1− vth1 and p = 12 .
where
vth1 ,
4J + x
4(1 + a+ J)
(10a)
v∗ ,
−2J +√4J2 + 4aJ2 + aJx
2aJ
. (10b)
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The above result tells us that one possible strategy is for the firm to introduce the product in
the first period after developing it fully. In this case, the firm may price the product differently
in the first and second periods. The next corollary reports an interesting finding regarding the
relative pricing of the full product in the two periods.
COROLLARY 1. If x < 4a, b > p, i.e. the firm follows a ”skimming” strategy while if 4a < x <
4(1 + a), the firm follows a ”penetration” pricing strategy.
Thus we find that if the word of mouth is very strong, the firm prefers to price low in the
first period and then increase its price. On the other hand, it prefers to go from a high price
to a low price in the second period if the word of mouth effect is weak. The threshold on the
word of mouth effect is dependent upon the value of exclusivity, a. Thus, increase in customer
utility due to exclusivity increases the propensity to do skimming pricing.
The other possible strategy for the firm is to introduce the product in the first period after
developing it only partially (beta strategy). The interesting finding here is that such partial
quality launches must be done at a first period price of zero. This is very much in confirmation
with the anecdotal evidence since we see most beta launches to be free. This also points out
that some of the real world examples that are called beta but have a price tag attached may
actually be closer to a high quality initial launch.
In choosing between the full quality launch and the beta launch, the firm considers the
tradeoffs between savings accrued in the product development process (advantage of beta
launch) and the revenue benefits of selling the product in the first period and the potentially
larger market mobilization in the second period (advantage of full quality launch). We now
provide some numerical example to illustrate the nature of these two equilibria.
Figure 2.2 illustrates firm’s profits with the beta launch and full quality launch policies.
The parameter values are a = 1, F = 2, x = 7 and J is varied from 1.1 to 1.414. The beta
launch is optimal with v = v∗ in this parameter set. It can be seen that profits with beta launch
dominate the full quality launch profits. Thus this example shows that beta launch can be the
equilibrium policy under some situations.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the impact of increase in the value of exclusivity on the firm’s profits
with the beta launch and full quality launch policies. The parameter values are F = 2, J =
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Figure 1: Beta launches can be an equilibrium policy
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Figure 2: Impact of Exclusivity
1.8, x = 8 and a is varied from 3 to 4. The beta launch is optimal with v = v∗ in this parameter
set. It can be seen that profits with the full quality launch increase beyond the profits with beta
launch as a increases. Thus exclusivity can move the choice of the product launch strategy in
favor of the full quality launch.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the impact of increase in the word of mouth effect on the firm’s profits
with the beta launch and full quality launch policies. The parameter values are F = 2, J =
1.39, a = 3 and x is varied from 10.25 to 10.29. The beta launch is optimal with v = v∗ in
this parameter set. It can be seen that profits with the beta launch overtake the profits with
full quality launch as x increases. Thus stronger word of mouth effects seem to favor beta
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launches.
3 Branded Products with Monetization Through Ad-
vertising
In this section, we look at the firm’s product launch options where the firm uses advertising for
monetization rather than direct pricing. The model is similar to the one used in Section 2 except
that the firm does not set prices for the launches. Instead the firm is realizes an exogenously
given value g per customer that it acquires. Thus, g reflects the value of an eyeball in the
online advertising industry. We are again interested in characterizing the firms optimal product
launch and pricing strategies.
3.1 The Model
Since the firm doesn’t charge the customers, (1)-(3) may be modified to
v + v(1− t1)a ≥ t1, (11)
v + u ≥ t2, (12)
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and
v + u ≥ t3. (13)
Note that the above equations reflect that the customers do not suffer a cost due to the adver-
tising shown to them. The typical advertisements load very quickly with the availability of
broadband and so we assume that this imposes only negligible delay costs on the consumers.
The firm takes decisions in the following sequence:
1. Firm decides the quality (v) for the initial launch and develops it.
2. Firm decides the additional quality (u) to be developed for the final launch and develops
the final product.
These decisions are taken in the first and second period, respectively.
Next, given that the firm derives value g for every customer acquired, the profit functions
in the two periods can be written as
pi2 = g[t2 + t3xt1]− (F − Jt1)u (14)
and
pi1 = (gt1 − Fv) + pi2, (15)
where the first two terms reflect the profit in the first period.
3.2 Analysis and Results
We first look at the equilibrium values of various market fractions.
LEMMA 2. The equilibrium values of various fractions are given as follows:
t1 =
v(1 + a)
1 + av
(16a)
t2 = u+ v (16b)
t3 = u+ v. (16c)
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To solve the firms profit maximization problem, we will use the standard backward induc-
tion technique. Our next result identifies the possible product launch strategies for the firm.
PROPOSITION 2. In equilibrium, the possible options for the firm are as follows
1. If J > g(1+x)1+a , the firm prefers a beta launch with v = vopt and u = 1− v.
2. If J ≤ g(1+x)1+a , the firm does a full quality product launch.
where
vopt ,
−J +
√
agJ + J2 + aJ2 + agJx
aJ
. (17a)
Thus if the benefit from reduction of product development costs are large enough ( J >
g(1+x)
1+a ), the firm prefers a beta launch. The threshold is increasing in word of mouth effect and
decreasing in the value of exclusivity. Thus strong word of mouth effects make a beta strategy
unlikely, whereas a strong exclusivity makes a beta launch strategy more likely.
Next, we are interested in exploring the differences between the impact of value of exclu-
sivity (a) and word of mouth effect (x) on the product launch strategies with the advertising
and the direct pricing model. We represent profit with beta launch as piAβ and with full quality
launch as piAfull. We find that
∂piAβ
∂a > 0 and
∂piAfull
∂a = 0. Thus, while exclusivity increases the
profits with beta launches, it has no impact with full quality product launch, unlike the direct
pricing model. This result points to the increased importance the firm must attach to savings in
product development from user feedback if it wants to take advantage of its brand image (and
corresponding exclusivity). We also find that piAβ and pi
A
full are both increasing in x. This effect
is thus similar to the situation with direct pricing.
We now want to explore how the relative qualities in beta launches differ with the direct
pricing and advertising models. The following result answers this question.
PROPOSITION 3. If the firm prefers the advertising model with a beta launch over the direct
pricing model with beta launch, it must be that vopt > v∗.
Clearly, then, the firm must invest much more upfront to develop its beta product if it is
utilizing the advertising model to monetize its web site. This happens because g must be large
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enough for the profits with advertising to be higher. At these value of g, the marginal revenue
from first period quality is higher for the beta. Hence the firm prefers to have a larger value of
v.
4 Web 2.0 Products with Direct Pricing
In this section, we look at the beta launch under an externalities based model. As discussed in
the Introduction, this model captures the product launch incentives of Web 2.0 based web sites
where a lot of product value is generated through user participation (e.g. Flickr). The details
of the model are similar to the one used in Section 2 except for the following differences. First,
in both periods, the value of a product depends positively on other users in the systems. This is
a case of positive externality, as opposed to the negative externality experienced by innovators
in the the first period in Section 2. Second, the extent of the positive externality depends on
the variety of inputs provided by the users. For example, in the context of Flickr, the more the
different types of pictures, say of marine life and mountain portraits, (as opposed to merely
the number of pictures) that are uploaded and tagged, the more the value created for the users.
This is in line with the long tail argument that users get value when a variety of their interests
are served rather when they get more of the same.
We are now interested in the following questions. First, what are the characteristics of a
beta launch, and second, is a public beta launch optimal.
4.1 The Model
As already discussed, we assume that the positive externalities depend on the variety of user
interests (and not just numbers). The variety brought about by innovators is different from
the variety brought about by imitators. This captures the realistic situation that the potential
market of imitators is bigger and hence the variety that they bring to the table is greater. We
normalize the value of variety from imitators to just the fraction of the imitator market that
is covered (t3). Correspondingly, the value of variety created by innovators is dt1 and dt2 in
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periods 1 and 2, where d < 1. In this case, (1)-(3) may be modified to
v + vdt1a− b ≥ t1, (18)
(v + u)[1 + (dt2 + t3)a]− p ≥ t2, (19)
and
(v + u)[1 + (dt2 + t3)a]− p ≥ t3. (20)
The profit functions remain unchanged from Section 2. Also note that hereon we use the
parameter a to represent the strength of externalities rather than exclusivity (as in the earlier
sections).
4.2 Analysis and Results
The firm takes the same sequence of decisions as in Section 2.
We first look at the equilibrium values of various fractions.
LEMMA 3. The equilibrium values of various fractions are given as follows:
t1 =
b− v
−1 + adv (21a)
t2 = − p+ u+ v−1 + a(1 + d)(u+ v) (21b)
t3 = − p+ u+ v−1 + a(1 + d)(u+ v) . (21c)
In addition, when b < v and p < (u+ v),
a ∗ d ∗ v < a(d+ 1)(u+ v) < 1 (22)
Proof. The proof is along the same lines as Lemma 1. For marginal customers, (18)-(20) are
satisfied with equalities. Solving the three simultaneous equations, we get (21).
We next look into possible strategies for the firm. Though we do not completely character-
ize the firm strategies in terms of available parameters, we identify a significantly reduced set
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of strategies, which include public beta launches. Our main result is as follows
PROPOSITION 4. In equilibrium, the possible options for the firm are as follows.
• If a > a∗ then b = 0. In addition, the possible strategies are:
– v = vth0, u = 0, p = vth02 .
– v = T, u = 0, p = T2 .
– v = v∗∗, u = T − v∗∗, p = T2 ,
• If a < a∗ then p = T2 . In addition, the possible strategies are:
– v = T, b = T8 (4− Tx1−a(1+d)T ), u = 0.
– v = vthT , b = 0, u = T − vthT .
– v = v∗∗, b = 0, u = T − v∗∗,
where
a∗ =
1
(1 + d)
(
1
T
− x
4
)
vth0 =
4
4a(1 + d) + x
vthT =
T (4J(−1 + a(1 + d)T )− Tx)
4(1 + J)(−1 + a(1 + d)T )
v∗∗ =
2J(−1 + a(1 + d)T ) +√J(−1 + a(1 + d)T )(−4J(−1 + adT )(−1 + a(1 + d)T ) + adT 2x)
2adJ(−1 + a(1 + d)T ) .
Note that the strategy v = v∗∗, u = T − v corresponds to the traditional beta launch: a
firm would release a product with full functionality at the end, with an optimal decision on the
first period quality.
The following example demonstrates that beta launches may turn out to be the optimal
policy under certain parameter conditions even when the utility function of customers is driven
by positive externalities rather than exclusivity.
EXAMPLE 1. When T = 1, F = 1, J = 10, x = 1, d = 0.1, we get the following. When
a < a∗ = 0.6818 (Figure 4), piuTb0v(v = v∗∗, b = 0, u = T − v∗∗, p = T/2) is irrelevant
(the relevant profit function is convex), piuTb0vth(v = vthT , b = 0, u = T − vthT , p =
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Figure 4: The plot of various profits versus a (a < a∗) in Example 1. The color coding is as
follows. BLUE: piu0bvT (v = T, b > 0, u = 0, p = T/2); PINK: piuTb0vth(v = vthT , b = 0, u =
T − vthT , p = T/2).
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Figure 5: The plot of various v versus a (a > a∗) in Example 1. The color coding is as follows.
GREEN: piu0b0vth(v = vth0, b = 0, u = 0, p = vth0/2); YELLOW: piu0b0vT (v = T, b = 0, u =
0, p = T/2).
T/2) is larger than piu0bvT (v = T, b > 0, u = 0, p = T/2), and the optimum policy is
v = vthT , b = 0, u = T − vthT , p = T/2. When a > a∗ (Figure 5), again piuTb0v is
irrelevant (the relevant profit function is convex), piu0b0vT (v = T, b = 0, u = 0, p = T/2)
is larger than piu0b0vth(v = vth0, b = 0, u = 0, p = vth0/2), and the optimum policy is
v = T, b = 0, u = 0, p = T/2.
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5 Web 2.0 Products with Advertising
In this section, we look at the beta launch under an advertising model. This model is similar
to the one used in Section 4 except that the firm does not set prices for the launches. Instead
the firm is realizes an exogenously given value g per customer that it acquires. Then we are
interested in the following questions. First, what are the characteristics of a beta launch, and
second, when is a public beta launch optimal and how does it compare to the public beta launch
under the direct pricing model.
5.1 The Model
Since the firm doesn’t charge the customers, (18)-(20) may be modified to In this case, (18)-
(20) may be modified to
v + vdt1a ≥ t1, (24)
(v + u)[1 + (dt2 + t3)a] ≥ t2, (25)
and
(v + u)[1 + (dt2 + t3)a] ≥ t3. (26)
The profit functions remain unchanged from Section 3.
5.2 Analysis and Results
The firm takes decisions in the following sequence:
1. Firm decides the quality (v) for the initial launch and develops it.
2. Firm decides the additional quality (u) to be developed for the final launch and develops
the final product.
These decisions are taken in the first and second period, respectively. To solve the firms profit
maximization problem, we will use the standard backward induction technique.
We first look at the equilibrium values of various fractions.
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LEMMA 4. The equilibrium values of various fractions are given as follows:
t1 =
v
1− adv (27a)
t2 =
u+ v
1− a(1 + d)(u+ v) (27b)
t3 =
u+ v
1− a(1 + d)(u+ v) . (27c)
In addition,,
a ∗ d ∗ v < a(d+ 1)(u+ v) < 1 (28)
Proof. (27) follow from Lemma 2 by substituting b = 0 and p = 0. Further, (28) follows from
the conditions t1 > 0 and t2 > 0
We next look into possible strategies for the firm. Though we do not completely character-
ize the firm strategies in terms of available parameters, we identify a significantly reduced set
of strategies, which include public beta launches. Our main result is as follows
PROPOSITION 5. In equilibrium, the possible options for the firm are as follows
• v = T, u = 0,
• v = vopte, u = T − vopte,
where vopte , J(−1+a(1+d)T )+
√
−J(−1+a(1+d)T )(J(1+a2d(1+d)T 2−a(T+2dT ))+adp(−1+a(1+d)T−Tx))
adJ(−1+a(1+d)T ) .
Note that the strategy v = vopt, u = T − v corresponds to the traditional beta launch: a
firm would release a product with full functionality at the end, with an optimal decision on the
first period quality.
We next look at an illustrative example to demonstrate that under some parameter condi-
tions, the beta launch policies can be optimal under some parameter conditions.
EXAMPLE 2. When T = 1, F = 1, J = 10, x = 1, d = 1, we get we get the following. In
the beginning vopte < T , piuTv(v = vopte, u = T − vopte) is the maximum, and the optimum
policy is v = vopte, u = T − vopte. However, when vopte > T , piu0vT (v = T, u = 0) is the
maximum, and the optimum policy is v = T, u = 0..
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Figure 6: The plot of various pi versus a in Example 2. The color coding is as follows. GREEN:
piu0vT (v = T, u = 0); YELLOW: piuTv(v = vopte, u = T − vopte).
6 Concluding Remarks
The current analysis shows that with product development cost saving considerations and
marketing implications, launching of public betas could be an equilibrium strategy, both for
branded firms like Google who take advantage of the “snob” effect by restricting access when
introducing a new product and for unbranded Web 2.0 firms who rely on network externali-
ties to make their offering more valuable. Our analysis yields quite general insights in that it
shows that beta launch strategies compete with the more common product introduction strate-
gies through price skimming or penetration pricing. We show that beta launches must be
characterized by a zero price irrespective of the type of firm. This says that most firms have
got it right when they don’t price their betas. Some of the rare exceptions which do attach a
price to their betas may be doing it due to some specific nature of the product category.
In case of branded products, we also find that increases in the “snob” effect will increase
the chances of a full quality product introduction with a skimming pricing strategy. Further,
stronger word of mouth effects favor the beta launch policy over the full quality product in-
troduction. Finally adopting a monetization model based on advertising causes the firm to
increase the quality of the beta product. We are also able to show that beta launches can be
optimal for Web 2.0 firms, both when they directly price their products and when they use
monetization through advertising.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is straightforward. The equilibrium values will be defined by the
marginal consumer: a consumer that is indifferent between using the product and his outside
option. First we look at the indifferent innovator in the first period and solve v+v(1−t1)a−b =
25
t1 (1) to get t1 =
−b+v(1+a)
1+av . Next we look at the indifferent innovator in the second period
and solve v + u − p = t2 (2) to get t2 = −p + u + v. Finally, we look at the indifferent
innovator in the second period and solve v + u− p = t3 (3) to get t3 = −p+ u+ v.
Note that t1 ≤ 1 implies b ≥ v and t1 ≥ 0 implies b ≤ v + av. Also, note that t2 ≤ 1
implies p ≥ u+ v − 1 and t2 ≥ 0 implies p ≤ u+ v.
Proof of Proposition 1. We first look at the pricing decision p ∈ [0,∞) in the second stage.
Using the equilibrium values (8), using (6) the profit function of the second period may be
written as
pi2 = p(t2 + t3xt1)− (Fu− Jt1u)
=
−u(F + aFv + J(b− (1 + a)v))− p2(1− bx+ vx+ av(1 + x))
(1 + av)
+
p(u+ v)(1− bx+ vx+ av(1 + x))
(1 + av)
.
(29)
Since d
2pi2
dp2
= −2(1−bx+vx+av(1+x))(1+av) < 0 and dpi2dp (0) = u+ v + (u+ v) (−b+v+av)x1+av > 0, from
(9) in Lemma 1 (i.e., t1 > 0⇒ av+v > b), pi2 is concave in p and we have an interior solution
from dpi2dp = 0. That is,
p =
(u+ v)
2
. (30)
Next, we look at the quality decision 0 ≤ u ≤ T − v in the second stage. Substituting for
p in (29), we get
pi2u =
−4u(F + aFv + J(b− (1 + a)v)) + (u+ v)2(1− bx+ v(a+ x+ ax))
4(1 + av)
. (31)
Since d
2pi2u
du2
= (1−bx+vx+av(1+x))2(1+av) > 0, from (9) in Lemma 1 (i.e., t1 > 0⇒ av + v > b), pi2u
is convex in u. Thus, in the second period, the firm will either go to the maximum possible
quality (i.e., u = T − v) or for the minimum possible quality (i.e., u = 0). For now, we keep
both the possibilities alive.
Next, we look at the price decision b ∈ [0,∞) in the first stage. Using p = (u+v)2 , the profit
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function in the first stage can be written as
pi1 = (bt1 − Fv) + pi2
= − Fv + b(−b+ v + av)
1 + av
+
−4u(F + aFv + J(b− (1 + a)v)) + (u+ v)2(1− bx+ v(a+ x+ ax))
4(1 + av)
.
(32)
Since d
2pi1
db2
= − 2(1+av) < 0, pi1 is concave in b. Assuming an interior solution, dpi1db = 0 gives
b =
−Ju+ v + av
2
− (u+ v)
2x
8
. (33)
The value of b is obviously dependent on the quality decision u in the second period. Note
that firm cannot offer cash incentives for trying out beta (negative price) because it cannot
discriminate between potential customers and ”free-riders” who may get the beta just to get
the cash that goes with it.
Before looking at the decision on the first stage quality, we derive conditions on v that
cause the first period price to be zero. First consider the case when the decision is to have
the maximum possible quality in the second period, i.e., u + v = T and v ≤ T . Then
b = (−JT+(1+a+J)v)2 − T
2x
8 , and b > 0 for v >
4JT+T 2x
4(1+a+J) = vth1. Next, consider the case with
minimum possible quality in second period i.e. u = 0 and v ≤ T . Then b = −v(−4−4a+vx)8 ,
and b > 0 for v < 4(1+a)x = vth2.
We are now ready to look at the decision on the first stage quality v. We look at four cases,
as follows. (Note that, for each of the these cases, the domain for v is different, to be consistent
with our earlier analysis.) First consider the case when the b=0 constraint is not binding and
the quality in the second period is the maximum possible, i.e., u = T − v and vth1 ≤ v ≤ T .
Substituting for b, and using u = T − v, the first period profit in (32) can be written as
pi1v1 =
16(JT + v + av − Jv)2 − 64F (T + aTv) + h2T 4x2
64(1 + av)
+
8T 2(2 + (JT + v − Jv)x+ av(2 + x))
64(1 + av)
.
(34)
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Since d
2pi1v1
dv2
= (4(−1+J)+a(−4+4JT+T
2x))2
32(1+av)3
> 0, this profit function is convex in v. Hence the
possible solutions are at the corners, i.e., at v = vth1 or at at v = T . That is, the firm’s optimal
strategy is given by v ∈ {vth1, T}, b ≥ 0, u = T − v, p = T2 .
Next consider the case when the b = 0 constraint is not binding and the quality in the
second period is minimum possible, i.e., u = 0 and 0 ≤ v ≤ vth2. Substituting for b, and
using u = 0, the first period profit in (32) can be written as
pi1v2 =
16v((1 + a)2v + (1 + av)(−4F + v)) + 8(1 + a)v3x+ h2v4x2
64(1 + av)
. (35)
Since d
2pi1v2
dv2
= 8a
3v3(2+x)+8a(4+h2v3x2+3v(2+x+vx))+2(8+3h2v2x2+4h(2+3vx))+a2(16+3h2v4x2+8v2(6+(3+v)x))
32(1+av)3
>
0, this profit function is convex in v. Hence the possible solutions are at the corners, i.e., at
v = 0 or at v = vth2. That is, the firm’s optimal strategy is given by v ∈ {0, vth2}, b ≥ 0, u =
0, p = v2 .
Next consider the case when the b=0 constraint is binding and the quality in the second
period is the maximum possible, i.e., u = T − v and 0 ≤ v ≤ vth1. Substituting for b = 0
first, and using u = T − v, the first period profit in (32) can be written as
pi1v3 = −FT + 4(1 + a)J(T − v)v + T
2(1 + v(a+ x+ ax))
4(1 + av)
. (36)
Since d
2pi1v3
dv2
= − (1+a)(4J(1+aT )+aT 2x)
2(1+av)3
< 0 and d
2pi1v3
dv2
(0) = (1+a)T (4J+Tx)4 > 0, this profit
function is concave in v and has a possible non-zero solution given by dpi1v3dv = 0. i.e., at
v =
−2J +√4J2 + 4aJ2T + aJT 2x
2aJ
, v∗ (37)
. However, depending on the relationship between v∗ and vth1, the optimum value is either at
vth1 (when v∗ ≥ vth1) or at v∗ (when v∗ ≤ vth1). That is, the firm’s optimal strategy is given
by v ∈ {v∗, vth1}, b = 0, u = T − v, p = T2
Finally, consider the case when the b=0 constraint is binding and the quality in the second
period is minimum possible, i.e., u = 0 and vth2 ≤ v ≤ T . Substituting for b = 0 first, and
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using u = 0, the first period profit in (32) can be written as
pi1v4 =
v[−4F + v(1 + (1+a)vx1+av )]
4
. (38)
Since d
2pi1v4
dv2
= (1+3vx+a
3v3(1+x)+3av(1+x+vx)+a2v2(3+(3+v)x))
2(1+av)3
> 0, this profit function is
convex in v. Hence the possible solutions are at the corners, i.e. at v = vth2 or at v = T . That
is, the firm’s optimal strategy is given by v ∈ {vth2, T}, b = 0, u = 0, p = v2 .
The following analysis is now simplified taking T = 1. We find that vth1 < 1 requires
x < 4(1 + a). However, under this condition vth2 > 1. Further, v∗ < vth1 requires either
J >
√
1 + a, or 1 < J <
√
1 + a and x > 4(1+a)(1+a−J
2)
aJ . This leads us to the results in the
statement of the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof follows from Lemma 1 by substituting b = 0 and p = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first look at the quality decision 0 ≤ u ≤ T−v in the second stage.
Using the equilibrium values (16) as well as (14) the profit function of the second period may
be written as
pi2 = g(t2 + t3xt1)− (Fu− Jt1u)
=
(1 + a)Juv − F (u+ auv) + gh(u+ v)(1 + vx+ av(1 + x))
1 + av
.
(39)
This is linear in u. Thus the equilibrium choice of u is either 0 or 1− v.
First, we look at the quality decision u = 0. From (16) and (15), the profit function in the
first stage can be written as
pi10 = (gt1 − Fv) + pi2
=
v(g(2 + a)− F (1 + av) + gv(a+ x+ ax))
1 + av
.
(40)
Since d
2pi10
dv2
= − (2(1+a)g(a−x)
1+av)3
, pi10 is convex in v if a < x and concave otherwise. When
a < x, pi10 is maximized at the corners, i.e., either at v = 0 or at v = T . However, v = 0,
u = 0 solution yields zero profits. Hence the only situation of interest is when v = T .
Next, when F > F1(v) and a > x, pi10 is concave and the maximizer can be either at the
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corner or at an internal point. We need to examine the potential internal solution. Solving the
first order condition dpi10dv = 0, we get this as
v = −−aF + g(a+ x+ ax)±
√−(1 + a)g(a− x)(gx+ a(−F + g(1 + x)))
a(gx+ a(−F + g(1 + x))) .
Since a > x, we must have (gx + a(−F + g(1 + x))) < 0. That is, g < aFh(a+x+ax) , gi.
Then, this internal solution is given by
vfix = −−aF + g(a+ x+ ax) +
√−(1 + a)g(a− x)(gx+ a(−F + g(1 + x)))
a(gx+ a(−F + g(1 + x))) . (41)
With some algebraic manipulation, it is easy to see that vfix > 0 requires F > 2g + ag (at
T = 1). However, the firm profits with vfix are positive only when F < 2g + ag. Thus vfix
can never be an admissible strategy.
Next we explore the situation when u = T − v. From (16) and (15), the profit function in
the first stage can be written as
pi1T = (gt1 − Fv) + pi2
=
(1 + a)J(T − v)v − FT (1 + av) + g((1 + a)v + T (1 + v(a+ x+ ax)))
1 + av
.
(42)
Since d
2pi1T
dv2
= − (2(1+a)(J+a(g+JT+gTx))
1+av)3
< 0, pi1T is concave in v and the maximizer can be
either at the corner or at an internal point. We need to examine the potential internal solution.
Solving the first order condition dpi1Tdv = 0, we get this as
v =
−J ±
√
agJ + J2 + aJ2T + agJTx
aJ
.
Since the optimal solution should be positive, the only solution of interest is
vopt =
−J +
√
agJ + J2 + aJ2T + agJTx
aJ
> 0. (43)
That is, we need not look at v = 0 as an optimal solution in this case. Further, vopt < T if
J > g(1+x)1+a (at T = 1).
30
Thus the firm will do a full quality launch when J ≤ g(1+x)1+a . When J > g(1+x)1+a , the firm
must choose between the beta launch and full quality launch strategies. Comparing the profits
of the firm with these two strategies, we find that the one with beta launch dominates when
J > g(1+x)1+a .
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall that the traditional beta launchs are made with first period qual-
ity vopt and v∗ under the advertising and direct pricing models, respectively. From (42), the
profit under the advertising model is given by
piadv =
2J − 2√J(J + a(g + JT + gTx))
a2
+
a(−aFT + J(2 + T + aT ) + g(1 + a+ aT + (1 + a)Tx)− 2√J(J + a(g + JT + gTx)))
a2
.
Similarly, from (36), the profit under the direct pricing model is given by
piprice =
4(1 + a)J(2 + aT )− 4√J(4(J + aJT ) + aT 2x)
4a2
+
a(T 2x+ aT (−4F + T + Tx)− 4√J(4(J + aJT ) + aT 2x))
4a2
.
Note that vopt is increasing in g while v∗ is independent of g. Further, vopt = v∗ at
g = T
2x
4(1+Tx) , gth. It can be verified that piprice − piadv = T
2
4+4Tx > 0 at g = gth.
Further, dpiadvdg (g = 0) =
−(1+a)J(1+Tx)+
√
J2(1+aT )(1+a+aT+(1+a)Tx)
a
√
J2(1+aT )
> 0 and d
2piadv
dg2
=
(1+a)(J+JTx)2
2(J(J+a(g+JT+gTx)))3/2
> 0. That is, piadv is positive and is always increasing in g. Thus, if the
advertising strategy were to be preferred over the direct pricing strategy (i.e., piadv > piprice),
it must be that g > gth. This implies that if the advertising model is employed, it must be that
vopt > v∗.
Proof of Proposition 4. We first look at the pricing decision p ∈ [0,∞) in the second stage.
Using the equilibrium values (21), using (6) the profit function of the second period may be
written as
pi2 = −Fu+ Ju(b− v)−1 + adv −
p(−p+ u+ v)
−1 + a(1 + d)(u+ v) −
p(b− v)(−p+ u+ v)x
(−1 + adv)(−1 + a(1 + d)(u+ v))
(44)
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When b < v and p < u+ v, from (22), d
2pi2
dp2
= (2(−1+ adv+ bx− vx))/((−1+ adv)(−1+
a(1+ d)(u+ v))) < 0 and dpi2dp (0) = − ((u+v)(−1+adv+bx−vx)(−1+adv)(−1+a(1+d)(u+v))) > 0. pi2 is concave in p and
we have an interior solution from dpi2dp = 0. That is,
p =
(u+ v)
2
. (45)
That is, the assumption p < u+ v is consistent.
Next, we look at the quality decision 0 ≤ u ≤ T − v in the second stage. Substituting for
p in (44), we get
pi2u = −Fu+Ju(b− v)−1 + adv−
(u+ v)2
4(−1 + a(1 + d)(u+ v))−
(b− v)(u+ v)2x
4(−1 + adv)(−1 + a(1 + d)(u+ v)) .
(46)
When b < v, from from (22), d
2pi2u
du2
= 1−adv−bx+vx
2(−1+adv)(−1+a(1+d)(u+v))3 > 0. That is, pi2u is convex
in u. Thus, in the second period, the firm will either go to the maximum possible quality (i.e.,
u = T − v) or for the minimum possible quality (i.e., u = 0). For now, we keep both the
possibilities alive.
Next, we look at the price decision b ∈ [0,∞) in the first stage. Using p = (u+v)2 , the profit
function in the first stage can be written as
pi1 = (bt1 − Fv) + pi2
= − Fu− Fv + b(b− v)−1 + adv +
Ju(b− v)
−1 + adv−
(u+ v)2
4(−1 + a(1 + d)(u+ v)) −
(b− v)(u+ v)2x
4(−1 + adv)(−1 + a(1 + d)(u+ v)) .
(47)
Since d
2pi1
db2
= − 2(1+adv) < 0, from (22), pi1 is concave in b. Assuming an interior solution,
dpi1
db = 0 gives
b =
−4Ju(−1 + a(1 + d)(u+ v)) + u2x+ v2(4a(1 + d) + x) + 2v(−2 + 2a(1 + d)u+ ux)
8(−1 + a(1 + d)(u+ v)) .
(48)
The value of b is obviously dependent on the quality decision u in the second period. Note
that firm cannot offer cash incentives for trying out beta (negative price) because it cannot
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discriminate between potential customers and ”free-riders” who may get the beta just to get
the cash that goes with it.
Before looking at the decision on the first stage quality, we derive conditions on v that
cause the first period price to be zero. First consider the case when the decision is to have the
maximum possible quality in the second period, i.e., u+ v = T and v ≤ T . Then
b =
−4J(−1 + a(1 + d)T )(T − v) + 4(−1 + a(1 + d)T )v + T 2x
8(−1 + a(1 + d)T ) < v, (49)
where the inequality follows from (22) (so b < v is consistent), and b > 0 for v > T (4J(−1+a(1+d)T )−Tx)4(1+J)(−1+a(1+d)T ) ,
vthT . Next, consider the case with minimum possible quality in second period i.e. u = 0 and
v ≤ T . Then
b =
v(−4 + 4a(1 + d)v + vx)
8(−1 + a(1 + d)v) < v, (50)
where the inequality follows from (22) (so b < v is consistent), and b > 0 for v < 44a(1+d)+x ,
vth0. Note that when a < 1(1+d)(
1
T − x4 ) , a∗ we get vthT < T as well as vth0 < T .
We are now ready to look at the decision on the first stage quality v. We first focus on the
case when the quality in the second period is the minimum possible, i.e. u = 0. Then we have
the following cases
• a > a∗, 0 < v < vth0, b > 0.
• a > a∗, vth0 < v < T, b = 0.
• 0 < a < a∗, 0 < v < T, b > 0.
When b > 0, substituting for b (50) in (47), we get the first period profit as
pi1u0b = −v[64F (−1 + adv)(−1 + a(1 + d)v)
2
64(−1 + adv)(−1 + a(1 + d)v)2)
+
v(32 + v(16a2(1 + d)(1 + 2d)v + x(8 + vx)− 8a(6 + vx+ d(8 + vx)))
64(−1 + adv)(−1 + a(1 + d)v)2) ]
(51)
From b < v and (22) it can be verified that d
2pi1u0b
dv2
> 0. That is pi1u0b is convex in v and the
optimum solution is given by v ∈ {0, vth0} when a > a∗ and by v ∈ {0, T} when a < a∗.
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We denote the eventual profits corresponding to v ∈ {0, vth0, T} as piu0bv0, piu0bvth, piu0bvT ,
respectively. Similarly, when b = 0, substituting for b in (47), we get the first period profit as
pi1u0b0 =
v
4
−4F + (v(1− adv + vx)
(−1 + adv)(−1 + a(1 + d)v)) . (52)
From b < v and (22) it can be verified that d
2pi1u0b0
dv2
> 0. That is pi1u0b is convex in v and
the optimum solution is given by v ∈ {vth0, T} when a > a∗. We denote the eventual
profits corresponding to v ∈ {vth0, T} as piu0b0vth, piu0b0vT , respectively. It can then be easily
verified that piu0bvth = piu0b0vth (since b = 0 at v = vth0), and we are left with four profits:
piu0bv0, piu0b0vth, piu0b0vT , piu0bvT .
We now look at the case when the quality in the second period is the maximum possible,
i.e., u = T − v. Then we have the following cases
• 0 < a < a∗, 0 < v < vthT , b = 0.
• 0 < a < a∗, vthT < v < T, b > 0.
• a > a∗, 0 < v < T, b > 0.
When b > 0, substituting for b (49) in (47), we get the first period profit as
pi1uTb = − pi1uTbN64(−1 + a(1 + d)T )2(−1 + adv) , (53)
where pi1uTbN = 16(−1+J)2v2+64FT (−1+a(1+d)T )2(−1+adv)−32(−1+J)Tv(J+
a(1+d)(−1+J)v)+T 4(−4a(1+d)J+x)2+8T 2(2+2J2(1+a(1+d)v(4+a(1+d)v))+
v(−2ad+2a2(1+ d)2v+ x)− Jv(4a(1+ d)(2+ a(1+ d)v) + x))− 8T 3(2a2(1+ d)(−d−
2(1 + d)J + 2(1 + d)J2)v − Jx + a(1 + d)(2 + 4J2 + vx − Jvx)). From b < v and (22)
it can be verified that d
2pi1uTb
dv2
= − (−4+4J(1+a2d(1+d)T 2−a(T+2dT ))+aT (4+4d−dTx))2
32(−1+a(1+d)T )2(−1+adv)3 > 0. That
is pi1u0b is convex in v and the optimum solution is given by v ∈ {vthT , T} when a < a∗. We
denote the eventual profits corresponding to v ∈ {vthT , T} as piuTbvth, piuTbvT , respectively.
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Similarly, when b = 0, substituting for b in (47), we get the first period profit as
pi1uTb0 = −FT + −4Jv
2 + 4JTv(1 + a(1 + d)v) + T 2(1− a(d+ 4(1 + d)J)v + vx)
4(−1 + a(1 + d)T )(−1 + adv) .
(54)
Now, d
2pi1uTb0
dv2
= −4J(−1+adT )(−1+a(1+d)T )+adT
2x
2(−1+a(1+d)T )(−1+adv)3 , and it is possible that pi1uTb0 either convex
or concave. If convex, then the optimum solution is given by v ∈ {vthT , T} when a < a∗
and by v ∈ {0, T} when a > a∗. If concave, then the optimum solution is given by v ∈
{0, vthT , v∗∗} when a < a∗ and by v ∈ {0, v∗∗, T} when a > a∗, where
v∗∗ ,
2J(−1 + a(1 + d)T ) +√J(−1 + a(1 + d)T )(−4J(−1 + adT )(−1 + a(1 + d)T ) + adT 2x)
2adJ(−1 + a(1 + d)T )
is the solution to dpi1uTb0dv = 0. We denote the eventual profits corresponding to v ∈ {0, vthT , v∗∗, T}
as piuTb0v0, piuTb0vth, piuTb0v, piuTb0vT , respectively. It can then be easily verified that piuTbvth =
piuTb0vth (since b = 0 at v = vthT ), piuTbvT = piu0bvT (when a < a∗), piuTb0vT = piu0b0vT
(when a > a∗), piuTb0v0 ≤ piu0bvT and we are left with two additional profits: piuTb0v, piuTbv0th.
Finally, it can be verified that piu0bv0 = 0. Overall, we need to compare three profits
depending on the value of a: when a > a∗, we compare piu0b0vth, piu0b0vT , piuTb0v; and when
a < a∗, we compare piu0bvT , piuTb0vth, piuTb0v.
Proof of Proposition 5. We first look at the quality decision 0 ≤ u ≤ T−v in the second stage.
Using the equilibrium values (27) as well as (14) the profit function of the second period may
be written as
pi2 = g(t2 + t3xt1)− (Fu− Jt1u)
= −Fu− Juv(−1 + a(1 + d)(u+ v)) + g(u+ v)(−1 + adv − vx)
(−1 + adv)(−1 + a(1 + d)(u+ v)) .
(55)
Since d
2pi2
du2
= − 2a(1+d)g(−1+adv−vx)
(−1+adv)(−1+a(1+d)(u+v))3 > 0 (28), pi2 is convex in u and the optimal deci-
sion belongs to the set u ∈ {0, T − v}.
Next, we look at the quality decision 0 ≤ v ≤ T in the first stage. We first look at the case
when the second period decision is u = 0. In this case the provider profit may be written as,
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using (27) and (55),
pi1u0 = gt1 + pi2− Fv
= v(−F + g(2− a(1 + 2d)v + vx)
(−1 + adv)(−1 + a(1 + d)v))
(56)
Since d
2pi1
dv2
= − (2g(−a(1+2d)+a4d(1+3d+4d2+2d3)v3−x+3a2d(1+d)v(2+vx)−a3d(1+3d+2d2)v2(3+vx))
1+a2d(1+d)v2−a(v+2dv))3 >
0 (28), pi1u0 is convex in v, and the optimal decision is given by v ∈ {0, T}. We denote the
eventual profits corresponding to v ∈ {0, T} as piu0v0, piu0vT , respectively.
Finally, we look at the case when u = T − v. In this case, the provider profits may be
written as, using (27) and (55),
pi1uT = gt1 + pi2− Fv
=
pi1uTN
(−1 + a(1 + d)T )(−1 + adv) ,
(57)
where pi1uTN = −J(−1 + a(1 + d)T )(T − v)v − FT (−1 + a(1 + d)T )(−1 + adv) +
g(v+T (1−a(1+2d)v+vx)). Now d2pi1uT
dv2
= −2(J+a2d(1+d)T (g+JT )−a(JT+d(g+2JT+gTx)))
(−1+a(1+d)T )(−1+adv)3 .
This could be positive as well as negative. That is, pi1uT may be convex or concave. If it
is convex, the optimal decision is given by v ∈ {0, T}. However, if it is concave, the op-
timal decision may be given by the internal solution vopte, which is the solution to dpiuTdv =
J(a(1+d)T 2+v(2−adv)+T (−1−2a(1+d)v+a2d(1+d)v2))+g(−1+a(1+d)T−Tx)
(−1+a(1+d)T )(−1+adv)2 = 0. Then, we get vopte =
J(−1+a(1+d)T )+
√
−J(−1+a(1+d)T )(J+a2d(1+d)T (g+JT )−a(JT+d(g+2JT+gTx)))
adJ(−1+a(1+d)T ) . We denote the
eventual profits corresponding to v ∈ {0, vopte, T} as piuTv0, piuTv, piuTvT , respectively.
Since the strategy v = T, u = 0 is the same as v = T, u = T − v, overall we need
to compare four profits: piu0v0, piu0vT , piuTv0, piuTv. This can be further reduced to three by
noticing that piu0vT ≥ piuTv0 always.
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